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MILITARY

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EXTERNAL

[redacted]

1. Aftermath of Moscow Communist Party Congress:

The Soviet press announced that Party activists in Moscow met on December 19 in the Kremlin to discuss the results of the November meeting of communist parties. The press said that the principle speaker was Frol KOZLOV but did not publish the text or even give a full summary of his speech. The press merely reported that the documents issued by meeting showed that agreed positions had been worked out by the parties on the most important questions of the contemporary period. According to the summary Kozlov repeated the Soviet claim that the major characteristic of the present period is that the existence of a world socialist system has become the decisive development in human society, that war can be prevented and peace consolidated. Kozlov was reported as stating that much attention was paid at the November meeting to strengthening the unity and the solidarity of the communist parties and to the importance of struggling against rightist and leftist deviations. Kozlov reportedly ended his speech by emphasizing the successful completion of the seven-year plan. It would appear from the summary at least of Kozlov's speech that he gave emphasis to the same positions taken by Soviet theorists before the November meeting. The fact that this speech was not published might be explained by the possibility that the Soviets are probably reluctant to bring the ideological dispute immediately into the open. However, that the theoretical dispute was not resolved or even satisfactorily compromised received substantial confirmation by various passages in a speech made by East German Communist boss Ulbricht on December 19 in which, to the Embassy's knowledge, for the first time a bloc party -- Albania -- was publicly accused of dogmatism and sectarianism. In this case Albania may have been used as a stalking horse for Communist China.

2. Laos:

After publishing its note last week to the US accusing the latter of responsibility for hostility in Laos and of interference in Laotian internal affairs, the Soviet press did not follow through with publication of the US reply or, for that matter, indicate that there had been a reply. At the same time the press did not report clearly that Vientiane had fallen to the Savanna Khet forces or that Boun Oun had been authorized by the king to form a new government. Last week the Soviet press reported that Souvanna Phouma had transferred power to Quinim. However, toward the end of the week it sought to erase this impression and leave instead the impression that Souvanna Phouma still was the legal head of government in Laos. Since then Quinim has been described as an agent of the Souvanna government.

Meanwhile the Soviets have proposed [redacted]

[redacted]

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3. US-Soviet Relations:

Renewal of charges concerning alleged US intelligence activities, specifically interception and deciphering of foreign governments' communications, came into prominence once more with the publication in Izvestiya (Dec. 20) of an interview with TASS by the two former NSA employees, MARTIN and MITCHELL. The interview seemed intended in part to counter unfavorable information on the two men which emerged from the US hearings on the case by portraying them as valuable, professionally respected members of the NSA staff. Izvestiya reproduced official letters of commendation to the two men written on NSA stationery to drive home the point. Martin's statement indicating that he had married a Soviet citizen was presumably intended to answer personal charges against him and Mitchell.

Publication of the interview also suggests that the Soviets may hope to exploit statements by Martin and Mitchell in what could be a campaign of pressure against the new US administration to discontinue intelligence activities, notably overflights and the Samos satellite. Although the RB-47 case was not mentioned by Martin or Mitchell, conceivably the interview was also connected with an announcement on the case.

A Soviet note published in Pravda (Dec. 21) protested an incident in the Mediterranean November 4 allegedly involving US Navy interference with passage of Soviet ships on the high seas.

4. NATO Ministerial Meeting:

Soviet propaganda continued to attack the concept of NATO as a fourth atomic power, alleging that the Norstad Plan was merely a plausible device for putting nuclear weapons into the hands of the West German forces. Press comment on the final communique concentrated on point seven as, supposedly, evidence of continuing strains within the alliance, specifically concerning the US offer of medium-range ballistic missiles. Pravda (Dec. 19) contended that the decision to refer the US proposal for further consideration pending the NATO Council meeting next May represented a severe defeat primarily for West Germany. As is invariably the practice in regard to NATO meetings, the Soviet press put heavy emphasis on alleged evidence of the disintegration of the alliance. Western press comment, notably a Sulzberger New York Times column "Fifteen Men On A Dead Man's Chest", was used to bolster the familiar propaganda theme.

5. France and Algeria:

Khrushchev's personal reply to Ferhat Abbas' telegram protesting alleged French repression in Algeria followed the cautious line taken in the TASS statement of December 15 (WEEKA 51) which constituted the initial Soviet response to the Abbas appeal. Khrushchev carefully avoided the use of inflammatory language in this message, or any suggestion of more direct Soviet involvement in support of the Algerians. His generalizations about Soviet sympathies for Algeria, conventional condemnation of French policy, and expressions of confidence that France will be unable to preserve its positions in Algeria seemed an extremely mild reaction to Abbas' request for Soviet help in stopping, as he put it, French genocide.

At the same time, a Pravda (Dec. 18) "Observer" article expressed the view that the January referendum was a deliberately vague scheme intended to win support for de Gaulle's allegedly weakening regime, and divide Algerians and thwart their hopes for independence. Characteristically, Pravda charged that the US and West Germany were well pleased with the prospect of "another Indo-China" in Algeria, the US because it hoped to replace France in North Africa, West Germany because continued French involvement assured Bonn's military predominance in Europe.

6. Cuba:

The Soviet-Cuban communique concluding the long and interrupted visit of the Che GUEVARA in Moscow was issued December 19. Little new or dramatic was revealed in the fields of economic assistance, trade, cultural, or presumed arms agreements, with the exception of the Soviet agreement to purchase up to 2.7 million tons of sugar in the event the US does not take its contracted quota. The communique was notable for its sharp attacks against the US, in line with the December Moscow Declaration and for its emphasis on the USSR's ability to support Cuba and potentially other Latin American countries which might sever their economic, political and security ties with the US.

7. Congo:

Brief and highly tendentious reports on the UN proceedings on Congo, exploitation of the "free Lumumba" campaign within the USSR, and restrained hope concerning the pro-Lumumba forces controlling Stanleyville -- these were the main constituents in the Soviet press projection of Congo developments to the Soviet public during the week. Publication in Pravda (Dec. 21) of a "free Lumumba" appeal signed by a number of eminent Soviet acientists (Academicians Nesmeyanov, Topchiev, Kapitsa, et al.) illustrated the main internal propaganda feature. The press also continued to portray African states, Ghana particularly, as highly disillusioned about the UN role in Congo.

INTERNAL

8. Leadership: (OFFICIAL USE ONLY) UNCLASSIFIED

Except for M.G. PERVUKHIN, the Soviet Ambassador to the GDR, all members of the Party Presidium attended the opening joint session of the USSR Supreme Soviet December 20.

The previous day, after being out of the public eye for two weeks with "grippe", Premier KHRUSHCHEV received two callers at the Kremlin and attended both the signing of the Soviet-Cuban Communique and a state reception for members of the Cuban economic Mission that evening. First Deputy Premier A.I. MIKOYAN, who has been handling much of the load in dealing with the Cubans, signed the communique for the Soviet side and spoke at the latter function.

Presidium candidate-member, A.P. KIRILENKO, who is also first secretary of Sverdlovsk Oblast has been given an apparent boost by publication of an exchange of correspondence between him and the Soviet Government and the CPSU which praises work done in his oblast and emphasizes its importance. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that Kirilenko's name is listed out of usual alphabetical order and placed after those of D.S. KOROTCHENKO and Ya. E. KALNBERZIN in the press accounts of the December 20 session of the Supreme Soviet.

Although not mentioned in the press, former Presidium member A.I. KIRICHENKO was reliably reported seen sitting at the Supreme Soviet with members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet to one side of the Party leaders group. The Embassy has not been able to confirm similar reports circulating that former Party Presidium member N.I. BELYAYEV also sat with the Supreme Soviet Presidium at the opening session. Neither man was recognized in any published photos which usually showed only a limited part of the Kremlin Palace. It is assumed that both Kirichenko and Belyayev remain members of the SS Presidium in the absence of any noted recall or removal action. (Kirichenko, absent from the 1960 May Day parade-presidium immediately preceding the May 4, 1960 CC plenum which dropped both him and Belyayev from the CC Presidium, was seen at the May 5 session of the Supreme Soviet.)

9. Election of Peoples' Judges: (UNCLASSIFIED)

Climaxing an "election campaign" of about 40 days, citizens of the RSFSR and other republics have been dutifully trooping to the polls to elect peoples' judges and peoples' assessors in an exercise of controlled "democracy". (Pravda, Dec.18). After the "election", some areas reported that as many as 95.5 percent of all qualified voters had "voted". The "election" provided a useful opportunity for a press and party campaign contrasting the "most democratic courts in the world" (in which judges having "the closest ties with the people" administer justice) with the bourgeois courts in the West which are termed organs of state oppression. It is some interest to note that TASS released two photographs of Khrushchev at the polls one with other voters of his (No. 47-Frunze Raion) voting district and the other dropping his ballot in the urn. Neither photograph seems to have been published locally as yet.

10. Executive Council Decree Reflects Continued Moscow Housing Shortage: (UNCL)

According to Moskovskaya Pravda, December 15, the Moscow City Ispolkom on September 20 passed a decree standardizing rules for qualifying for housing (abridged in Soviet Translation Service Press Review, December 19). The new order applies both to new housing allocated by the Ispolkom (about 30% of the total built) and to housing regulated by factories and other establishments. As before, first priority goes to those "contributing most to the economy". This is determined by housing commissions consisting of party trade union and government representatives and others.

Despite such a priority concept, the article asserts that persons no longer should receive new quarters if they already live under satisfactory and sanitary conditions. Ispolkoms of Moscow's 22 raions allegedly will have to insist that a "definite portion of housing will be allotted to those persons moved from wrecked houses, barracks and cellars" (not in translated version). It is promised that "almost exclusively" housing will be given to Moscow employees and workers and that Government ministries and agencies will be discouraged from importing employees from outside areas to the capital. Apparently Moscow's more solid log cabins will get a new lease on life, as destruction of "usable" old houses is to proceed "with discretion". Consideration in assigning quarters will be given to proximity to place of work in an effort to reduce strain on the transport system.

11. Moscow City Party Organization : (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

It is unusual that the name of Moscow City Party First Secretary P.N. DEMICHEV does not head the list of city personages signing the city's report of 1960 plan fulfillment to the Central Committee, Council of Ministers, and Khrushchev front-paged in Pravda of December 23. Instead, this "honor" was accorded "Secretary" V.I. STEPANKOV who had been promoted to second secretary of the city apparatus at a December 9 plenum addressed by Demichev as first secretary. (The Dec. 9 plenum also released the former second secretary Ye. K. RAGOZIN in connection with his appointment as first deputy chairman of the Moscow City Sovharkhoz and secretary S.M. BUTUZOV transferred to the Moscow City Executive Committee, and elected two new subordinate secretaries, A. Ye. BIRYUKOV and F.P. DEMEMENT'YEVA.)

The Embassy has had no indication of anew assignment, illness or other reason which would indicate a change in Demichev's status. However, he was absent also from the Dec. 19 meeting of Moscow party activists which was opened by Stepakov and addressed by CPSU CC Secretary F.R. Kozlov. Neither has he been among the speakers at the USSR Supreme Soviet session thus far.

MILITARY

Negative

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For the Ambassador:

Boris H. Klesson

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Counselor for Political Affairs

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